Nigeria’s digital economy is expanding rapidly, but the growth is exposing a challenge that goes beyond the amount of fibre, submarine cables and telecommunications infrastructure being deployed across the country.

The bigger question is resilience: whether the systems supporting the digital economy can continue functioning when part of the infrastructure fails.

That question is becoming increasingly important as connectivity moves deeper into banking, digital payments, commerce, healthcare, education, government services and everyday communication.

A major disruption to West Africa’s submarine cable network in March 2024 provided a clear illustration of the vulnerability. Four major cables, ACE, SAT-3, WACS and MainOne, were damaged after a suspected underwater rockslide off the coast of Côte d’Ivoire, affecting connectivity in 13 African countries, including Nigeria.

The incident also demonstrated that having several cables does not necessarily mean having several independent routes.

The Internet Society found that the four affected cables converged around the same physical area off Côte d’Ivoire, creating a potential single point of failure. Countries with alternative connectivity paths were better positioned to maintain service, while traffic was rerouted through unaffected systems.

For Nigeria, that distinction is important as the country continues to expand its digital infrastructure.

A network can have multiple cables, fibre routes or facilities and still remain exposed if those assets share a common physical location, terrestrial corridor, landing facility or other critical component.

The vulnerability is not limited to submarine infrastructure.

The Nigerian Communications Commission disclosed in August that more than 5,000 fibre-cut incidents were recorded in the first six months of 2026, with road construction, excavation and related civil works among the major causes. (NCC)

The scale of the problem highlights the need for better coordination between telecommunications operators, road contractors, government agencies and other stakeholders before excavation and construction work begins.

The NCC has already established a Standing Committee with the Federal Ministry of Works and the Federal Ministry of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy to develop mechanisms for protecting fibre infrastructure before, during and after road projects. The Office of the National Security Adviser has also been brought into the process because of the strategic importance of telecommunications infrastructure.

The implications of these disruptions extend far beyond telecommunications operators.

A damaged fibre route can interrupt businesses processing transactions, customers making digital payments, hospitals relying on communications, government platforms providing services and workers whose activities depend on reliable internet access.

As digital dependence increases, the resilience of telecommunications infrastructure becomes part of the resilience of the wider economy.

That importance is reflected in the government’s designation of telecommunications networks, base stations, fibre-optic cables, data centres, towers and internet exchange points as Critical National Information Infrastructure.

The NCC says disruption to such infrastructure could affect banking, healthcare, education, transportation, government services and other essential functions.

It therefore changes the question that should be asked about infrastructure development.

It is no longer enough to ask how much additional capacity Nigeria is building.

The country must also ask how much of that capacity remains available when one part of the system is disrupted.

That requires diversity at several levels.

Different submarine cables should have sufficiently diverse landing points and inland routes. Fibre networks should avoid unnecessary concentration along the same road corridors. Critical facilities need alternative connectivity and power arrangements, while networks require enough spare capacity to absorb traffic when another route becomes unavailable.

Geographic diversity is particularly important.

Several networks may appear to provide redundancy but can still be exposed to the same disruption if they pass through the same corridor or depend on the same facility.

This makes the next phase of Nigeria’s fibre expansion especially significant.

Project BRIDGE, officially described as Building Resilient Digital Infrastructure for Growth, is designed to deploy at least 90,000 kilometres of fibre-optic infrastructure across Nigeria through a public-private partnership. The project is intended to extend the national fibre backbone, connect local government areas and improve access to schools, hospitals, businesses and underserved communities.

The African Development Bank has also approved a $200 million loan for the broader digital infrastructure initiative, which is expected to extend Nigeria’s national fibre backbone from about 30,000 kilometres to roughly 120,000 kilometres and establish additional cross-border links.

The success of this expansion should therefore be assessed by more than the kilometres of fibre deployed.

A more meaningful measure would include how many genuinely independent routes connect critical locations and how much traffic can continue to move when one route is lost.

The same principle applies to international connectivity.

Additional submarine cables can increase capacity, but their contribution to resilience also depends on where they land, how traffic is transported inland and whether alternative systems have enough capacity to handle traffic during a major outage.

The resilience question also extends to government intervention in the communications sector.

The Nigerian Communications Act 2003 gives the NCC emergency powers under Section 148 in specified circumstances involving a public emergency or public safety. These powers include suspending a licence, taking temporary control of network facilities and restricting the use of services or network facilities in specified circumstances. (Scribd)

Such powers have a legitimate place where circumstances require emergency action to protect public safety or address a public emergency.

But in an economy increasingly dependent on digital connectivity, interventions affecting communications infrastructure can have consequences beyond their immediate purpose.

An emergency measure may address one problem while also affecting the continuity of services that depend on the network.

This makes service continuity an important consideration alongside the immediate objective of emergency intervention.

The issue, therefore, is not whether government should have emergency powers.

It is whether the resilience of essential digital services is sufficiently considered when those powers are exercised.

The Communications Act itself recognises the importance of survivability and recovery. Section 149 allows the NCC to require licensees or classes of licensees to develop disaster plans for the survivability and recovery of services and network facilities during disasters, crises or civil emergencies.

The NCC’s 2023 Guidelines on Disaster Recovery for the Nigerian Communications Industry go further, providing a framework for disaster preparedness, business continuity, information sharing, mutual aid and faster restoration of services.

These provisions are particularly relevant as Nigeria’s economy becomes more dependent on uninterrupted connectivity.

For critical services, restoration alone may not be enough.

A bank may eventually restore its connection. A hospital may eventually recover communications. A government platform may eventually return to service.

The more immediate questions are what happens before restoration.

Can payments continue?

Can emergency communications remain available?

Can businesses switch to alternative routes?

Can networks absorb traffic displaced from a failed system?

These are questions of resilience.

They also demonstrate why the challenge cannot be reduced to fibre vandalism or the performance of individual telecommunications operators.

The sources of disruption are diverse.

A submarine cable can fail. A road project can sever fibre. Equipment can malfunction. Power can be lost. Vandalism can interrupt a route. A cyber incident can affect critical systems.

An emergency intervention can also restrict access to communications infrastructure.

The response must consequently be layered.

Physical diversity requires alternative cables, ducts and corridors.

Technical diversity requires alternative networks, power arrangements, data centres and failover systems.

Geographic diversity reduces dependence on the same locations and routes.

Service continuity protects critical economic and public functions.

Regulatory safeguards can help ensure that emergency measures take account of their wider implications for connectivity while preserving the ability of government to respond to genuine emergencies.

The NCC’s reporting of major fibre-cut incidents can also provide a valuable basis for identifying recurring weaknesses.

The value of such information should extend beyond repairing individual failures.

It can help identify common dependencies connecting apparently separate networks and show where a disruption in one part of the system could affect several others.

This is increasingly important as digital infrastructure becomes more closely tied to national development.

Nigeria cannot eliminate every infrastructure failure. Fibre will be cut, equipment will malfunction, submarine cables will require repairs and emergencies will occur.

The objective should be to ensure that the failure of one route, facility or intervention does not automatically become a wider failure of essential digital services.

Connectivity has moved beyond being simply a telecommunications service.

It is now part of the infrastructure supporting economic activity, public services, financial transactions, healthcare, commerce and communication.

For Nigeria, the next stage of digital infrastructure development should therefore be measured not only by how much more capacity the country builds, but by how resilient that capacity is.

The real test of Nigeria’s digital economy is not simply how much connectivity it has when everything is working.

It is how much of the digital economy can continue moving when part of the infrastructure stops working.