Nigeria’s growing dependence on digital connectivity is creating a new dimension of economic risk as telecommunications networks become critical to banking, electronic payments, commerce, logistics, government services and other activities, while the state retains emergency powers capable of affecting network availability.
The issue presents a different form of vulnerability from physical infrastructure failure.
Also read: NCC advances dig once pricing framework for broadband
In March 2024, an underwater incident off the West African coast triggered failures affecting the West Africa Cable System (WACS), ACE, MainOne and SAT-3 subsea cable systems.
Within hours, parts of Nigeria’s digital economy began to experience disruption, with some banking applications and USSD services becoming unavailable, Point-of-Sale (POS) transactions affected and businesses struggling to access digital services.
NetBlocks estimated that the disruption cost Nigeria about ₦273 billion in economic activity over the four-day period.
The episode demonstrated the economic consequences when critical connectivity infrastructure fails.
But Nigeria’s digital economy faces another network-availability question: telecommunications services can also be restricted under emergency powers exercised by the state.
Under Section 148 of the Nigerian Communications Act 2003, the Nigerian Communications Commission has emergency powers that can include suspending a licence, taking temporary control of network facilities, or withdrawing wholly or partially the use of services or network facilities in a public emergency or in the interest of public safety.
The practical implications of such powers were demonstrated in September 2021, when telecommunications services were suspended across Zamfara State following security concerns.
Such interventions may arise from security imperatives. But their economic significance has increased as connectivity has become embedded in the country’s economic infrastructure.
Electronic payments, agency banking, POS transactions, digital commerce, cloud services, logistics, remote work and online public services increasingly depend on the availability of telecommunications networks.
This creates a policy tension that is becoming more significant: emergency measures may be required to address security threats, while prolonged or geographically broad disruption of network services can affect citizens, businesses and critical economic activities.
The Communications Act itself recognises the importance of maintaining network survivability during emergencies.
Section 149 provides for disaster and emergency planning, including arrangements directed at the survivability and recovery of services and network facilities during a disaster, crisis or civil emergency.
The provisions place network availability within a broader emergency-management framework, where security intervention and continuity of essential services can become interconnected considerations.
The issue is particularly relevant because the vulnerability of Nigeria’s digital infrastructure is not limited to government intervention.
In the first six months of 2026 alone, the Nigerian Communications Commission reported 5,934 fibre cuts, equivalent to roughly 33 incidents every day.
The figure illustrates the extent to which physical infrastructure remains exposed to road construction, civil excavation, vandalism and other forms of damage.
At the international level, Nigeria also remains exposed to concentration in critical connectivity infrastructure.
Although the country has begun diversifying international connectivity, including through newer subsea systems landing outside Lagos, Lagos remains the principal hub for international submarine cable infrastructure and digital interconnection.
The March 2024 cable failures demonstrated how disruption affecting several international systems simultaneously could spread quickly into domestic economic activity.
The response to such vulnerabilities increasingly involves building redundancy rather than relying on a single route, facility or provider.
That includes geographically separated data and network infrastructure, alternative terrestrial fibre routes, greater diversity in subsea cable landing points, stronger protection of critical fibre corridors and deeper domestic interconnection.
The Internet Exchange Point of Nigeria (IXPN) already enables networks to exchange domestic traffic locally rather than unnecessarily routing it through international transit networks.
Greater local peering and interconnection can therefore form part of efforts to reduce exposure to external connectivity failures.
The same resilience principle is relevant when considering emergency telecommunications intervention.
A network architecture capable of maintaining essential services through the failure of a particular route or facility can also provide greater scope for limiting the geographic and economic consequences of disruptions.
The question is therefore not simply whether emergency powers should exist.
It is how emergency powers, network resilience and continuity requirements interact in an economy where telecommunications availability increasingly determines whether transactions and services can function.
Where a security threat is geographically specific, the policy challenge includes achieving the necessary security objective while limiting unnecessary disruption to unaffected citizens, businesses and critical services.
Clear procedures, proportionality, accountability and appropriate review mechanisms are among the considerations relevant to that balance.
The growing importance of connectivity has also changed the significance of telecommunications infrastructure itself.
In June 2024, President Bola Tinubu signed the Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII) Designation Order, formally recognising critical ICT infrastructure, including telecommunications infrastructure, fibre-optic networks, data centres and other digital facilities, as assets whose protection is important to national security and economic activity.
The designation reflects the extent to which the telecommunications sector has moved beyond being simply a commercial service provider to becoming part of the infrastructure supporting wider economic activity.
NCC Executive Vice Chairman, Dr Aminu Maida, described modern infrastructure as “virtual, interconnected, and crucial to every sector of society,” adding that “resilience is not a luxury—it is a national imperative.”
That resilience now has both a physical and regulatory dimension.
Nigeria must contend with subsea cable failures, terrestrial fibre cuts and other infrastructure disruptions that can occur without government intervention.
At the same time, emergency regulatory powers can affect the availability of telecommunications services when authorities respond to public-safety or security concerns.
The distinction matters because the two forms of disruption arise from different causes and require different policy responses.
Physical resilience requires infrastructure diversification, redundancy, stronger protection of fibre corridors, domestic interconnection and improved recovery arrangements.
Regulatory resilience requires an emergency framework that recognises both legitimate security requirements and the economic importance of continuity for essential digital services.
Nigeria’s digital economy is becoming too interconnected for network availability to be viewed solely as a telecommunications-sector issue.
The March 2024 subsea cable disruption showed the economic consequences of infrastructure failure.
The 5,934 fibre cuts recorded in the first half of 2026 demonstrate that terrestrial networks remain exposed to repeated physical disruption.
The Zamfara shutdown, meanwhile, provides a concrete example of telecommunications services being restricted as part of a security response.
Together, these developments point to a broader policy question around the resilience of Nigeria’s digital economy: how can critical networks remain capable of supporting economic activity through physical failures while also allowing the state to respond effectively to genuine emergencies?
The challenge is not simply to build more connectivity.
Also read: NCC advancesdig once pricing framework for broadband
It is to ensure that the country’s expanding digital economy has sufficient infrastructure redundancy, recovery capacity and emergency arrangements to withstand disruption without allowing a localised failure or intervention to cascade into a wider economic shock.
Freelanews is the editorial byline of Freelanews.com, used for staff reports, news updates, press releases, and collaborative stories produced by the Freelanews Editorial Team.
